
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

FROM:

Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

Answers

- 1. Doug's memorandum, "Answers", is important in pointing up the ambiguities we will face on monitoring and verification questions.
- 2. To me it seems to be an intelligence question of what the Soviets can gain from cheating and what risk of detections they would be incurring. When the next step is taken weighing whether the opportunity for advantage exceeds the risk of detection will be getting into a policy question.
- 3. We should very carefully develop for ourselves a set of standards which as clearly as possible define the boundaries between intelligence policy and this ambiguous area. When we are satisfied with it be sure it is understood and accepted in the policy and legislative communities.

William J. Casey

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